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In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a landmark decision in the case of pharmaceutical sales representative Alfred 
Caronia. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
had approved sodium oxybate 
(Xyrem) for treating narcolepsy, 
but Caronia promoted it for a wide 
range of nonapproved (off-label) 
indications, including insomnia, 
Parkinson’s disease, and fibromy-
algia. Off-label use is common, 
especially in specialties such as 
oncology, in which it may even be 
considered the standard of care. 
However, surveys have revealed 
that supporting evidence is lack-
ing for a majority of off-label 
uses of medical products.1 The uses 
Caronia proposed were not based 
on high-quality data and were like-
ly to cause patients substantial 
harm (sodium oxybate, or gamma-
hydroxybutyrate, is also known 
as the “date-rape drug” in non-
clinical use).
Nonetheless, because prosecu-
tors relied on Caronia’s own words 
to show that he intended the drug 
to be used for nonapproved pur-
poses, in violation of the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
the appeals court reversed the con-
viction, holding that Caronia’s sales 
pitches were protected commercial 
speech under the First Amendment.
In recent years, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has expanded the con-
ception of what counts as “speech” 
in the eyes of the law and has 
generally increased its legal pro-
tections. For example, in a 2011 
case, the Court held that protected 
speech included sales data used by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
more efficiently target marketing 
to physicians.
Still, the Caronia decision sub-
verted decades of presumptions 
about how the government could 
oversee the behavior of the phar-
maceutical and medical device in-
dustries. For over 50 years, the 
FDCA has required that drugs (and 
later, high-risk devices) be labeled 
for all uses intended by their man-
ufacturers and that their safety 
and efficacy for those uses be first 
demonstrated in clinical trials. The 
FDA created “safe harbors” allow-
ing companies to distribute peer-
reviewed literature or answer phy-
sician questions. However, until 
the Second Circuit’s Caronia deci-
sion, if a company promoted in-
tended uses that had not been FDA-
approved, that promotion would 
be clear evidence that the product 
was misbranded and that its sale 
for those uses was illegal. The 
fact that the work of pharmaceu-
tical sales representatives involved 
speech did not matter before 
Caronia.
Many observers worried that if 
other federal courts, or even the 
Supreme Court, adopted Caronia’s 
holding, it could adversely affect 
the U.S. health care system, by sub-
stituting marketing for science. 
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Manufacturers could secure FDA 
approval of products for very nar-
row indications on the basis of 
highly limited data and then 
widely promote case series, poorly 
designed trials, and inadequately 
controlled observational “real-
world” evidence to support addi-
tional uses, to the potential detri-
ment of patients and payers.
Since that decision, the gov-
ernment has continued to obtain 
large settlements in investigations 
of off-label promotion, which sug-
gests that the pre-Caronia approach 
still carries some weight. Yet two 
subsequent Second Circuit cases 
have followed Caronia’s precedent. 
In a 2015 case involving a pre-
scription fish oil approved for 
treating patients with very high 
triglyceride levels, Amarin Pharma-
ceuticals sought to promote the 
product for patients with moder-
ately high levels, an indication 
that the FDA did not consider 
scientifically valid absent addi-
tional supporting data.2 Instead 
of developing and providing those 
data, Amarin went to court. After 
the FDA received an unfavorable 
preliminary decision, it settled 
the case, letting the manufacturer 
make its contested claims and 
even providing a special preclear-
ance pathway for future claims 
Amarin might want to make. In 
another 2015 case involving the 
off-label use of a postsurgical 
pain-relief drug, the FDA hastily 
approved the broader contested 
indication, averting any court de-
cision that would add further 
weight to Caronia and Amarin.
Legal battles have also erupted 
in at least two other federal cir-
cuits. These cases involve whistle-
blowers who reported off-label 
marketing by manufacturers of 
high-risk medical devices. A Texas 
jury found executives not guilty, 
but a Massachusetts jury convicted 
two executives. In the latter case 
(Facteau), the prosecutors alleged 
that although the company sought 
FDA approval for a narrow use of 
its device for opening up sinuses, 
it had always intended to market 
it for broader uses for delivering 
drugs. The jury convicted the two 
executives of 10 misdemeanor 
counts.
When the Facteau case is ulti-
mately reviewed by the First Cir-
cuit, it will be the first real test 
of Caronia’s reasoning outside the 
Second Circuit. The prosecutor’s 
strategy has been to emphasize 
that the Facteau jury, unlike the 
Caronia jury, was instructed to rely 
not merely on speech in determin-
ing whether the product was mis-
branded, but on actions as well. 
We do not see how that point 
helps, since the prosecution still 
relied on the defendants’ speech 
— including e-mail messages, 
phone calls, training videos, and 
marketing brochures — as evi-
dence of their illegal intent to 
sell a misbranded product. If the 
Constitution forbids doing A — 
as Caronia held — it would also 
forbid doing A+B.
Instead, we believe that the 
First Circuit and other courts need 
to reject Caronia on its merits. The 
FDCA’s intent requirement is like 
innumerable other laws that re-
quire juries to determine whether 
a party had a certain intent when 
undertaking certain acts. It may 
be perfectly legal to buy a gun or 
drive across state lines, but if a 
defendant’s own speech reveals he 
or she did so as part of a conspir-
acy to sell cocaine or a murder-
for-hire plot, that speech is rou-
tinely used to prove the illegal 
intent. Before Caronia, such uses 
of speech as evidence were not 
considered violations of the First 
Amendment.
Defendants in these cases are 
also trying to lure the courts into 
evaluating whether their off-label 
promotional claims are true or 
false. Though the First Amend-
ment does not protect false and 
fraudulent speech, the principle is 
irrelevant to a misbranding case.3 
(Similarly, in a cocaine case, the 
defendant’s speech may be used 
as evidence of an illegal intent, 
regardless of whether it is true.)
The more important question 
is: Should the FDA or the courts 
evaluate product claims? Congress 
established the FDA’s premarket-
ing approval process to channel 
claims about safety and efficacy 
into an expert agency, where the 
claims can be evaluated rigorous-
ly and independently on the basis 
of submitted evidence. The pro-
cess thus creates an incentive for 
companies to undertake the sci-
entific research that is required 
for FDA approval, an incentive 
that applies to both original in-
tended uses and new uses. In fact, 
about half of the FDA’s approvals 
Should the FDA or the courts evaluate product claims? 
Congress established the FDA’s premarketing approval 
process to channel claims about safety and efficacy 
into an expert agency, where the claims can be 
evaluated rigorously and independently 
on the basis of submitted evidence.
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each year are for new uses of pre-
viously approved drugs, which turn 
off-label uses into on-label ones.4 
This gateway function remains a 
key way of ensuring that health 
care is based on robust science, 
so that patients are protected and 
wasteful spending is minimized.
Still, sensing that the time may 
be ripe for a major policy shift, 
the drug and bio-
logics industry re-
cently released pro-
posed guidelines for 
a new approach to off-label pro-
motion.5 They seek a rollback of 
FDA regulation, so that they can 
instead “responsibly” promote new 
uses to physicians, even beyond 
the safe harbors the FDA already 
allows. The FDA, for its part, is 
undertaking a comprehensive re-
view of its rules about off-label 
promotion.
We fear that these develop-
ments could be the beginning of 
an FDA retreat from the FDCA’s 
fundamental precepts, which re-
quire that basic standards for 
proof of safety and efficacy be 
met for every intended use of a 
drug or high-risk medical device. 
Rather than acceding to the 
views of two judges in one fed-
eral circuit, we hope that the FDA 
continues to stand on principle. 
The U.S. Constitution should 
not be misconstrued in such a 
way as to undermine the pri-
mary functions of federal regu-
lation in this area: to protect 
patients and to create a high-
quality market for drugs and 
devices that is driven by science 
rather than hype.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available at NEJM.org.
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NIH Policy on Single-IRB Review — A New Era in Multicenter 
Studies
Ann‑Margret Ervin, Ph.D., M.P.H., Holly A. Taylor, Ph.D., M.P.H., and Stephan Ehrhardt, M.D., M.P.H. 
Review of the ethics of multi-center clinical studies is typi-
cally conducted by the institutional 
review board (IRB) of each partic-
ipating center. Extensive evidence 
suggests that the current practice 
is costly, is unnecessarily duplica-
tive, and delays commencement of 
research.1 The U.S. government has 
permitted single-IRB review and 
other streamlined review models 
since 1991, but few investigators 
have taken advantage of those 
options.2
In June 2016, the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH) issued 
new guidance on single-IRB re-
view of multicenter studies.3 The 
policy was introduced as a means 
to increase the efficiency of mul-
ticenter studies, reduce the time 
to study initiation, promote con-
sistency of ethics review, allevi-
ate the burden on investigators 
and administrators, and eventu-
ally reduce research costs. Under 
the new policy, U.S. centers par-
ticipating in NIH-funded multi-
center studies must use a single 
IRB for initial and ongoing ethics 
review. As of May 25, 2017, this 
policy will apply to investigators 
submitting applications for non-
exempt multicenter studies involv-
ing human participants and using 
a common study protocol. The 
policy does not apply if it is pro-
hibited by “federal, tribal, or state 
law, regulation or policy.”3 The 
NIH will consider other exceptions 
with appropriate justification.
The single-IRB policy ushers in 
new and important responsibili-
ties for investigators. A proposal 
for use of a single IRB must be 
included with the initial applica-
tion, and at that time all involved 
U.S. institutions must agree to use 
the selected IRB. If funding is 
awarded, federal guidance requires 
a signed IRB-authorization agree-
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